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The Common Law Liability of Minnesota
Liquor Vendors for Injuries
Arising From Negligent Sales
Liquor vendors have traditionally been held not liable
at common law for injuries perpetrated by their patrons
after consuming the purchased liquor. A recent series
of cases has imposed liability, however, for injuries incurred by a third party as a result of an illegal sale. The
author of this Note examines the likelihood that such a
remedy may be recognized in Minnesota and the desirability of making it available. He concludes that both
theoretical and practical considerations justify according an innocent third party a common law cause of
action for injuries proximately resulting from certain
kinds of illegal sales.

INTRODUCTION
We are fully mindful that policy considerations and the balancing of
the conflicting interests are the truly vital factors in the molding and
application of the common law principles of negligence and proximate
causation. But we are convinced that recognition of the plaintiff's
claim will afford a fairer measure of justice to innocent third parties
whose injuries are brought about by the unlawful and negligent sale
of alcoholic beverages to minors and intoxicated persons, will strengthen
and give greater force to the enlightened statutory and regulatory precautions against such sales and their frightening consequences, and will
not place any unjustifiable burdens upon defendants who can always
discharge their civic responsibilities by the exercise of due care. 1

Minnesota liquor vendors have long been held liable under
liquor licensing2 and bonding' statutes and the Civil Damage
1. Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 NJ. 188, 905, 156 A.2d 1, 10 (1959).
2. An early statute provided that a liquor licensee was liable for all damages caused by persons intoxicated by liquors obtained from him after his
license had been voided by a judgment forfeiting his bond posted in compliance
with the liquor license laws. Minn. Sess. Laws 1858, ch. 74, § 5. This provision
remained in effect until 1905.
3. Minn. Sess. Laws 1905, ch. 246, § 1, provided that the bond posted in
compliance with the liquor licensing statutes be used to cover damages to a
party injured as a result of a violation of the liquor laws by the licensee.
Although amended, this section exists today substantially as enacted. Mn.
STAT. ANN. § 840.12 (Supp. 1964).
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("dramshop") Act [hereinafter CDA]' for damages resulting
from unlawful sales of liquor. In recent years a number of courts
have imposed non-statutory liability by permitting the maintenance of a common law negligence action against the vendor by
a third party who suffers injury at the hands of a vendee as a
proximate result of illegal sales.5 Most of these decisions have
reasoned that the violation of statutes prohibiting sales or transfers of liquor to minors or intoxicated persons constitutes negligence per se.o One has held that the vendor is liable only if he
knew or could reasonably be expected to have known that the
sale was illegal.7 The availability of a common law negligence
action in Minnesota is not altogether clear. The purpose of this
Note is to discuss both the degree to which it may be available
and its desirability.

I. AVAILABILITY OF THE COMMON LAW ACTION
A. Ti TRmD ToWARD RRCOGNITION
Numerous cases hold that at common law persons injured by
an intoxicate have no remedy against the vendor of the liquor,
consumption of which caused the intoxication.8 When an explana4. The Minnesota Civil Damage Act (hereinafter cited as CDA), enacted
in 1911, provides that those injured by an intoxicated person may recover
from the vendor who, by illegally transferring liquor to such person, caused
his intoxication. MMN. STAT. § 340.95 (1961). An excellent general discussion
of the Minnesota Civil Damage Act may be found in Note, 46 MmWN. L. REV.
169 (1961).
5. Waynick v. Chicago's Last Dep't Store, 269 F.ad 822 (7th Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 362 U.S. 903 (1960); Windorski v. Doyle, 219 Minn. 402, 18
N.W.2d 142 (1945); Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959);
Jardine v. Upper Darby Lodge No. 1973, 413 Pa. 626, 198 A.2d 550 (1964);
Smith v. Clark, 411 Pa. 142, 190 A.2d 441 (1963); Corcoran v. McNeal, 400
Pa. 14, 161 A.2d 367 (1960); Schelin v. Goldberg, 188 Pa. Super 341, 146 A.2d
648 (1958).
6. The absence of a "dramshop" act or its inapplicability to extraterritorial
injuries may provide some explanation for the results of these cases. See Waynick v. Chicago's Last Dep't Store, supra note 5 (Illinois "dramshop" act had
repeatedly been held to have no extraterritorial effect; sale occurred in Illinois
but injuries inflicted in Michigan upon Michigan residents); Schelin v. Goldberg, 188 Pa. Super. 341, 146 A.2d 648 (1958) (Pennsylvania "dramshop" act
repealed shortly before case arose).
7. Rappaport v. Nichols, 81 NJ. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959). See note 16 infra
and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Collier v. Stamatis, 63 Ariz. 285, 288-89, 162 P.2d 125, 126
(1945); Cowman v. Hansen, 250 Iowa 358, 368-73, 92 N.W.2d 682, 686-90
(1958); Demge v. Feirstein, 222 Wis. 199, 203, 268 N.W. 210, 212 (1936). See
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tion is given it is either one of two rationales. The one infrequently advanced is that a sale of liquor to a "competent" person does not constitute negligence.' The more common rationale,
known as the "common law rule," is that the voluntary consumption of the liquor by the vendee, and not its transfer by
the vendor, is the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury.10
also Annot., 180 A.L.R. 352, 357-62 (1941).

A great number of cases contain statements to the same effect which are
dicta, or at least severely weakened, because made in the context of a civil
damage act suit, e.g., James v. Wicker, 809 Ill. App. 397, 33 N.E.2d 169
(1941); Campbell v. Harmon, 96 Me. 87, 51 Atl. 801 (1901); and Kraus v.
Schroeder, 105 Neb. 809, 182 N.W. 364 (1921), or a suit based on some other
common law theory. Cherbonnier v. Rafalovich, 88 F. Supp. 900 (D. Alaska
1950), or a suit brought by an intoxicated person suing for injuries to himself,
Hitson v. Dwyer, 61 Cal. App. 2d 803, 148 P.2d 952 (Dist. Ct. App. 1943),
or a suit by a plaintiff whose claim was dependent upon the rights of another
whose claim was barred because he was the intoxicated person, Barboza v.
Decas, 811 Mass. 10, 40 N.E.2d 10 (1942).
9. Manthei v. Heimerdinger, 832 Ill. App. 835, 352, 75 N.E.2d 132, 140
(1947); Buntin v. Hutton, 206 Ill. App. 194, 197 (1917). This rationale scarcely
deserves comment when applied to certain kinds of illegal sales since such
transfers would appear to involve clear cases of negligence per se. Waynick v.
Chicago's Last Dep't Store, 269 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 862
U.S. 903 (1960); Smith v. Clark, 411 Pa. 142, 190 A.2d 441 (1963). See the
excellent analysis of negligence in Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 NJ. 188, 156 A.2d
1 (1959), quoted in text accompanying note 16 infra. These cases reason that
liquor statutes prohibiting sales to intoxicated persons or minors are intended
to protect the general public as well as vendees. As stated by Justice Musmanno, "An intoxicated person amid a group of people is a constant source
of danger and hurt to those about him. He is the proverbial bull in a china
shop . . . ." Corcoran v. McNeal, 400 Pa. 14, 19, 161 A.2d 867, 370 (1960). It

is a general principal of tort law that if plaintiff is among the group a statute
was intended to protect and suffers injury from the harm the statute was
designed to avoid, the violation of the statute constitutes at least "evidence"
of negligence and in most states is negligence per se. Lowndes, Civil Liability
Created by Criminal Legislation, 16 Maur. L. REv. 361 (1932); Morris, The
Relation of CriminalStatutes to Tort Liability, 46 HARv. L. Rnv. 453 (1933);
RESTATEMENT, TORTS H§ 286-87 (1934). See note 23 infra and accompanying
text for analysis of the argument that a sale may be negligent even though
legal.
10. See, e.g., Cowman v. Hansen, 250 Iowa 358, 92 N.W.2d 682 (1958);
State ex rel. Joyce v. Hatfield, 197 Md. 249, 78 A.ld 754 (1951). Such reasoning would appear to reflect little more than a policy decision not to make a
vendor liable to those injured by persons to whom he makes negligent sales of
liquor. As Dean Prosser has pointed out, proximate cause involves a factual
determination only when the issue is causation in fact. See Prosser, The Minnesota Court on Proximate Cause, 21 MrN. L. REv. 19 (1936). Since the
negligent sale clearly bears some factual relationship to the injury in the
present context, the ultimate issue becomes one of social policy - to what
extent the vendor should be held responsible for the consequences of his sale.
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These apparently deep-rooted common law doctrines have
been rejected in a recent series of cases recognizing the existence
of a common law negligence action by an injured third party
against the vendor." This development began in Pennsylvania
with Schelin v. Goldberg, which held that violation of a statute
prohibiting sales to obviously intoxicated persons was negligence
per se. A subsequent Pennsylvania case, Jardine v. Upper Darby
Lodge No. 1978,1 expressly rejected the common law proximate
cause rule. The court assumed that the sale in issue constituted
negligence. It then reasoned that since the sale of firearms to
incompetents is regarded as a proximate cause of injuries subsequently inflicted upon third persons as a result of the negligent
The proximate cause rationale also appears to encompass the negligence
rationale. To say that the vendee was competent is to imply that the consumption was voluntary, and that the intoxicate was responsible for his acts
and was the sole proximate cause of the injury. Support for this analysis can
be found in the two recognized exceptions to the common law rule of proximate cause. The first involved sales to slaves. See Skinner v. Hughes, 18 Mo.
440 (1850); Harrison v. Berkley, 82 S.C.L. (1 Strobh.) 525 (1847). The second
involves a wife's suit for loss of consortium against a liquor vendor who,
despite requests from the wife that he refrain from selling to her husband and
knowledge of the husband's intemperate habits, continues to sell liquor to the
alcoholic husband. See Pratt v. Daly, 55 Ariz. 5w5, 104 P.2d 147 (1940);
Swanson v. Ball, 67 S.D. 161, 290 N.W. 482 (1940); Riden v. Grimm Bros., 97
Tenn. 220, 36 S.W. 1097 (1896); Annot., 130 AL.R. 352, 362-65 (1941).
But see Cole v. Rush, 45 Cal. 2d 345, 289 P.2d 450 (1955). Both exceptions are
premised on the view that the vendee is incompetent and that his consumption
therefore cannot be regarded as the proximate cause of the injury. But it
would also seem that a sale to an incompetent is negligent. Therefore, the
rationale based upon an absence of negligence seems in fact to be another
way of stating that the "voluntary" act of consumption by a competent
vendee broke the chain of causation.
11. See cases cited note 5 supra.
12. 188 Pa. Super. 341, 146 A.2d 648 (1958). In this case an intoxicated
plaintiff was illegally served liquor by the defendant and subsequently struck
by another patron. The court held that the statute prohibiting sales to intoxicated persons was designed to protect vendees, and that violation of the
statute was negligence per se. Although the court did not discuss the common law rule of causation, the affirmance of a judgment for plaintiff points to
its rejection. The court apparently reasoned that the sale to the plaintiff
rendered him incapable of protecting himself.
Subsequent cases have held that similar statutes were also intended to
protect the general public from intoxicated persons. Waynick v. Chicago's
Last Dep't Store, 269 FRd 322 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 862 U.S. 903
(1960); Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959); Smith v. Clark,
411 Pa. 142, 190 A.2d 441 (1963).
18. 418 Pa. 626, 198 A.2d 550 (1964). In Jardine the defendant served an
intoxicated person, who then negligently drove his automobile and struck the
plaintiff, a pedestrian.
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use of the firearms, liquor vendors ought likewise be treated as
proximately causing damages inflicted upon third persons by intoxicated vendees. In Rappaport v. Nichols'5 perhaps the
leading case in this area, plaintiff was injured in an automobile
collision. The other driver had been served liquor illegally by
the defendant while a minor and intoxicated. After an exhaustive,
well-reasoned analysis of both the negligence and proximate cause
issues, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a sale of liquor
in violation of statute which could have been avoided through
the exercise of reasonable care renders the vendor liable to a
third person subsequently injured by the vendee. As to negligence
the court reasoned that:
. . . Where a tavern keeper sells alcoholic beverages to a person
who is visibly intoxicated or to a person he knows or should know
from the circumstances to be a minor, he ought to recognize and foresee the unreasonable risk of harm to others through action of the
intoxicated person or the minor. The Legislature has in explicit terms
prohibited sales to minors as a class because it recognizes their very
special susceptibilities and the intensification of the otherwise inherent
dangers when persons lacking in maturity and responsibility partake
of alcoholic beverages; insofar as minors are concerned the sale of the
first drink which does "its share of the work" . . . and which generally
leads to the others is unequivocally forbidden. . . . In furtherance of
the legislative policy, ... [an administrative agency has by regulation]
provided that no licensee shall permit any minor to be served or consume any alcoholic beverages; and the same regulation contains a provision against service to or consumption by any person "actually or
apparently intoxicated." It seems clear to us that these broadly expressed restrictions were not narrowly intended to benefit the minors
and intoxicated persons alone but were wisely intended for the protection of members of the general public as well....
. . . If the patron is a minor or is intoxicated when served, the
tavern keeper's sale to him is unlawful; and if the circumstances are
such that the tavern keeper knows or should know that the patron
is a minor or is intoxicated, his service to him may also constitute
common law negligence. In view of the standard of conduct prescribed
by the statute and the regulations, a tavern keeper's sale of alcoholic
beverages when he knows or should know that the patron is a minor
or intoxicated may readily be found by the jury to be imprudent
conduct.'
14. Id. at 631-82, 198 A.2d at 553. The rule which holds liable one who
puts firearms in the hands of an incompetent is ancient. See Anderson v.
Settergren, 100 Minn. 294, 111 N.W. 279 (1907), and authorities cited therein.
15. 31 NJ. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959).
16. Id. at 201-02, 156 A.2d at 8-9. See note 18 infra for a discussion of the
defense that the vendor's violation could not have been avoided by the exercise
of reasonable care.
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In rejecting the common law rule of proximate causation, the
court said that:
. . . [A] tortfeasor is generally held answerable for the injuries
which result in the ordinary course of events from his negligence and
it is generally sufficient if his negligent conduct was a substantial
factor in bringing about the injuries. ... The fact that there were also
intervening causes which were foreseeable or were normal incidents of
the risk created would not relieve the tortfeasor of liability. . . . If
. . . the defendant tavern keepers unlawfully and negligently sold
alcoholic beverages to Nichols causing his intoxication, which in turn
caused or contributed to his negligent operation of the motor vehicle
at the time of the fatal accident, then a jury could reasonably find
that the plaintiff's injuries resulted in the ordinary course of events
from the defendant's negligence and that such negligence was, in fact,
a substantial factor in bringing them about. And a jury could reasonably find that ... [the vendee's activities in injuring plaintiff were] a
normal incident of the risk they created, or an event which they could
reasonably have foreseen, and that consequently there was no effective
.17
breach in the chain of causation ...

B.

MNNESOTA LAW

1.

Negligence PerSe

Overwhelming Minnesota authority holds that the violation
of a statute enacted for the protection of the class of people to
which the injured party belongs, and designed to avoid the harm
which he has suffered, is negligence per se.' 8 Moreover, the court
17. Id. at 203-04, 156 A.2d at 9.
The court drew analogies to liability for the sale of firearms, see note 14
supra, and to the liability of car owners who leave their keys in the ignition
in violation of statute for injuries to third persons when the car is driven
by a thief. Such responsibility has been recognized in several jurisdictions. See
Ross v. Hartman, 139 F.Rd 14 (D.C. Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 790
(1944); Ney v. Yellow Cab Co., 2 Ill. 2d 74, 117 N.E.2d 74 (1954); Kinsley v.
Von Atzingen, 20 NJ. Super. 878, 90 A.2d 87 (1952). But see Anderson v.
Theisen, 281 Minn. 869, 43 N.W.2d 272 (1950).
18. See, e.g., Anderson v. Settergren, 100 Minn. 294, 111 N.W. 279 (1907);
Bott v. Pratt, 33 Minn. 328, 23 N.W. 237 (1885). See also authorities cited
in note 9 supra.
In this respect Minnesota law differs from that of New Jersey, which holds
that such a violation is merely evidence of negligence, rebuttable by defendant's proof that he acted reasonably. Thus in the leading case of Evers v.
Davis, 86 NJL. 196, 205, 90 Atl. 677, 681 (Ct. Err. & App. 1914), the court
said that "a defendant, although he cannot be heard to say that it was not
his duty to obey the statute, may show what he did in his effort to obey it,
leaving it to the jury to say whether such effort was what a reasonably
prudent person would have done in view of the statute." The New Jersey
Supreme Court applied this rationale to illegal sales of liquor in Rappaport v.
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would appear to have recognized the applicability of negligence
per se theory to hold vendors liable for injuries arising from their
unlawful sales of liquor. In Windorski v. Doyle," plaintiff's
decedent was assaulted in defendant's tavern by a drunken
patron. Plaintiff alleged in the alternative that defendant had
negligently sold liquor to the assailant while the latter was
"obviously intoxicated" in violation of a city ordinance, and that
defendant negligently sold liquor to one known to become belligerent when drinking. On appeal from a verdict directed in
defendant's favor, the court ordered a new trial and held that
the question whether the assailant was "obviously intoxicated"
presented an issue of fact for jury determination. Thus, in the
only reported Minnesota case where the question whether an
unlawful sale constitutes negligence per se has arisen, the court
tacitly agreed with plaintiff that it did.o Moreover, it would
not seem that the fact that the injured person in Windorski was
another patron of defendant's bar and was injured while in the
bar serves to mark the outer limits of the class to whom the
ordinance was designed to afford protection. In Anderson v.
Settergren,m defendant sold cartridges and loaned a rifle to a
minor in violation of a statute. Plaintiff was injured when the
minor negligently discharged the rifle, and the court held that
plaintiff, as a member of the general public, was within the class
of people intended to be protected. Numerous cases and the
language of the CDA indicate that while statutory restrictions
on the sale of liquor were undoubtedly intended partially to
protect consumers unable to care for themselves, they were also
Nichols, 31 NJ. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959). Of course, the wording of the statute
will determine whether different results will follow from application of the
two rules. For example, if the statute prohibits sale of liquor to an "obviously
intoxicated" person, see MNr. STAT. § 340.14 (1961), it would seem that a
Ending that the vendor violated the statute would preclude any finding that
he acted reasonably, since the statute itself incorporates a standard of reasonable conduct.
19. 219 Minn. 402, 18 N.W.2d 142 (1945).
20. The Windorski opinion is not explicit on this point. It is possible that
the language regarding violations of statutes and ordinances referred to a
suit to collect on the licensee's bond. However, the bond was not mentioned
in the complaint, and the court's opinion fails to refer to it. Furthermore, the
court's holding that the question of obvious intoxication was an issue for the
jury was set forth in the context of a discussion of plaintiff's claim that the
evidence of negligence presented a question of fact for jury determination. The
briefs also regard the question of an illegal sale as going to the presence of
negligence. Brief for Appellant, p. 13; Brief for Respondent, p. 7.
21. 100 Minn. 294, 111 N.W. 279 (1907).
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designed to protect the general public from such persons. 2 The
statutes reflect a legislative judgment that minors and intoxicates
to whom liquor is served are troublesome and a menace to everyone with whom they come into contact.23
There are some illegal sales, however, which probably should
not be held to constitute negligence per se. For example, a sale
of liquor to a parolee of a state penal institution is illegal, 4 but
22. See Waynick v. Chicago's Last Dep't Store, 269 F.2d 322, 325-26
(7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 903 (1960); Connolly v. The Nicollet
Hotel, 254 Minn. 373, 382-83, 95 N.W.2d 657, 665 (1959); Rappaport v.
Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 201-02, 156 A.2d 1, 8 (1959). A brief discussion of early
criminal statutes relating to drunkenness appears in Hall, Drunkenness as a
Criminal Offense, 32 J. CRIM. L. & C. 297-99 (1941). The author concludes
that these statutes are designed to protect the public. See also the CDA,
Mxt. STAT. § 340.95 (1961), granting "every person . . . injured ... by any
intoxicated person" a cause of action against the vendor.
23. See Klingbeil v. Truesdell, 256 Minn. 360, 363, 98 N.W.2d 134, 138
(1959); Rappaport v. Nichols, supra note 22; Corcoran v. McNeal, 400 Pa. 14,
19, 161 A.2d 367, 370 (1960); of. Hall, supra note 22, at 298.
The preceding textual discussion of the common law liability of liquor
vendors has been predicated on the occurrence of an illegal sale. A sale by a
licensed vendor within the permitted hours of sale, see MnqN. STAT. Aim. §
340.14 (Supp. 1964), is legal unless made to a minor, habitual drunkard, uncivilized Indian, public prostitute, spendthrift, parolee, or an improvident or
obviously intoxicated person, see Mum. STAT. §§ 340.14, .73, .78, .82,.83 (1961).
It is arguable, however, that a lawful sale should be regarded as negligent
under certain circumstances. Examples might be the sale of a few drinks to a
patron who the bartender knows or has reason to know will be operating an
automobile shortly thereafter, or to a patron who the bartender knows becomes violent after consuming relatively small quantities of liquor. For a case
where the Minnesota court apparently held a vendor liable to a patron injured
in a barroom brawl under circumstances similar to the second example, see
Windorski v. Doyle, 219 Minn. 402, 407, 18 N.W.2d 142, 145 (1945). A line
of cases holding that a tavern keeper is bound to exclude from his premises
persons likely to produce discord and brawls may also lend collateral support
to the imposition of a duty to refrain from sales which foreseeably will produce injury. See Klingbeil v. Truesdell, supra; Priewe v. Bartz, 249 Minn. 488,
492-93, 83 N.W.2d 116, 120 (1957); Windorski v. Doyle, supra; Mastad v.
Swedish Brethren, 83 Minn. 40, 43, 85 N.W. 913, 914 (1901).
These cases, however, require the exercise of care for patrons, and the court
may well be reluctant to hold that such a duty is owed to the general public.
To hold the vendor liable to the general public for injuries arising from lawful
sales which produce some foreseeable risk of injury would, as a practical
matter, make the vendor absolutely responsible for the conduct of his patrons.
Moreover, the legislature has manifested in the CDA and license bond provisions an intent that liquor dealers be liable only for injuries arising from
illegal sales. As a matter of public policy, the court is thus likely to regard
the duty owed the public as being satisfied by obedience of the liquor laws.
24. Mn. STAT. § 340.83 (1961).
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it is difficult to believe that its prohibition was intended to protect the general public from injuries caused by a parolee. Rather,
the intent would seem to be to assist in the rehabilitation of the
parolee. Moreover, the sale of a drink at 7:30 on a weekday
morning is also illegal, 25 but it is hard to perceive a link between
the illegal nature of the sale and the risk of injury which it
creates. Therefore, the only illegal sales that should constitute
negligence per se are those which are prohibited because they
increase the risk of the injury which has in fact occurred and
upon which suit is brought.

2.

Causation

The crux of the common law denial of liability was the refusal, as a matter of social policy, to recognize the liquor vendor's
sale as a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury.o A somewhat
question-begging statement of the proximate cause requirement
in Minnesota is that "the harm following the negligence [must]
be in an unbroken sequence without an intervening efficient
cause . . . ."2 As a general rule, however, an actor is held responsible for the results, whether or not foreseeable" of his negligent
conduct in combination with reasonably foreseeable intervening
causes," including the negligence of others.8 o While intervening
criminal acts or intentional torts are frequently held to break the
chain of causation and consequently to avoid liability even when
foreseeableax the opposite result has been reached in cases arising
25. MmN. STAT. Amr. § 340.14 (Supp. 1964).
26. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
27. See Kalberg v. Anderson Bros. Motor Co., 251 Minn. 458, 460, 88
N.W.2d 197, 199 (1958), and authorities cited therein.
28. See Prosser, supra note 10, at 38-47, and authorities therein cited.
29. See, e.g., Crawford v. Woodrich Const. Co., 239 Minn. 12, 57 N.W.2d
648 (1953); Eichten v. Central Minn. Co-op Power Ass'n, 224 Minn. 180, 28
N.W.2d 862 (1947); Vills v. City of Cloquet, 119 Minn. 277, 138 N.W. 3
(1912); Neidhardt v. City of Minneapolis, 112 Minn. 149, 127 N.W. 484 (1910).
Foreseeability is determined as of the time of the defendant's act or
omission. Carpenter, Workable Rules for Determining Proximate Cause (pt. 1),
20 CAIw. L. REv. 229, 241 (1932); McLaughlin, Proximate Cause, 39 HARV. L.
REV. 149, 182-83 (1925).
30. See, e.g., Ferraro v. Taylor, 197 Minn. 5, 265 N.W. 829 (1936); Anderson v. Settergren, 100 Minn. 294, 111 N.W. 279 (1907).
31. See, e.g., Kalberg v. Anderson Bros. Motor Co., 251 Minn. 458, 88
N.W.2d 197 (1958); Anderson v. Theisen, 231 Minn. 369, 43 N.W.2d 272
(1950). But see Carpenter, Workable Rules for Determining Proximate Cause
(pt. 8), 20 CALm. L. REv. 471, 504-07 (1932), where the author concludes that
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from a failure to protect patrons from intoxicated persons.82 On
the other hand, the intervention of an unforeseeable cause bars
the imposition of liability upon the original actor, but only for
unforeseeable results." Thus liability may be imposed upon the
original actor notwithstanding the intervention of another cause
if either an additional cause or the particular result for which it
is sought to hold him responsible was reasonably foreseeable
when he acted.
Intervening causes and/or results have been held foreseeable
in four Minnesota cases. In one, Vills v. City of Cloquet," a child
was injured while playing with dynamite negligently left by the
defendant in an unprotected place. By analogy to the "turntable
cases," 5 the court held that the child's presence and play and
the resulting injury were foreseeable. In Ferrarov. Taylor," the
defendant lessor leased an automobile which the lessee drove
despite his knowledge that it was defective. As a result of its
condition the automobile collided with plaintiff's automobile. In
holding the defendant liable despite the intervening negligence
of the lessee, the court held that both the intervening negligence
and the resulting accident were foreseeable. The court also found
liability in Anderson v. Settergren,7 where the defendant neglithe occurrence of foreseeable intervening criminal acts should not preclude a
finding of proximate cause. The cases are collected at Annot., 78 A.LR. 471
(1982).
82. See case cited in note 45 infra and accompanying text.
83. Dean Prosser has pointed out that if no injury could have been foreseen, the actor is simply not negligent. Prosser, supra note 10, at 47. However,
if the injury could have been foreseen, but the intervening cause could not,
the question whether to assign responsibility becomes essentially one of social
policy. The Minnesota court has held the original actor liable in such cases.
See id. at 58-57.

84. 119 Minn. 277, 188 N.W. 88 (1912).
35. These cases held that children who were injured while playing on
unsafe railroad turntables were entitled to recover from the railroads. The
doctrine originated in Railroad Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657 (1878),
but was first explained in Keffe v. Milwaukee & St. P. Ry., 21 Minn. 207
(1875). It has since become known as the attractive nuisance doctrine and
has been broadened to apply to other situations in which a dangerous condidition attractive to children is maintained by the defendant on his land. The
theory underlying such liability is that the defendant is negligent in
maintaining the condition because he ought to have foreseen that children
would trespass and be injured. See, e.g., Mattson v. Minnesota & N.W. Wis.
Ry., 95 Minn. 477, 104 N.W. 443 (1905).
86. 197 Minn. 5, 265 N.W. 829 (1986).
87. 100 Minn. 294, 111 N.W. 279 (1907).
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gently sold cartridges and loaned a rifle to a minor. It impliedly
held that both the minor's negligent discharge of the rifle and
the resulting injury were foreseeable." In Wedel v. Johnson,0 the
rule imposing liability for foreseeable results notwithstanding the
intervention of an unforeseeable cause was applied to a bizarre
sequence of events. Defendant negligently permitted his horse
to run free in violation of a statute. The horse was subsequently
struck and killed by the automobile of a third party. Plaintiff
was injured when his automobile struck the carcass.
Swinfin v. Lowry"' is the only case in which the Minnesota
court has held that one who makes an illegal transfer of liquor
is not liable under the common law for injuries sustained as a
result of its consumption." In that case the defendants, friends
of a minor, furnished him liquor. After consuming it and becoming intoxicated, the minor assaulted the plaintiff. The court
denied recovery, apparently on the ground that the attack and
resulting injury were unforeseeable to the defendants when they
38. The court's reasoning is not explicit on this point. However, it quoted
with approval Lord Ellenborough's statement that, "Every man must be taken
to contemplate the probable consequences of the act he does." Townsend v.
Wathen, 9 East 977, 280, 103 Eng. Rep. 579, 580-81 (K.B. 1808).
39. 196 Minn. 170, 264 N.W. 689 (1986).
40. 87 Minn. 845, 84 N.W. 22 (1887).
41. There are numerous other Minnesota cases which state the common
law rule. See, e.g., Randall v. Village of Excelsior, 258 Minn. 81, 83, 103
N.W.2d 181, 133 (1960); Strand v. Village of Watson, 245 Minn. 414, 419, 72
N.W.2d 609, 614 (1955); Beck v. Groe, 245 Minn. 28, 33-34, 70 N.W.2d 886,
891 (1955); Hahn v. City of Ortonville, 238 Minn. 428, 433, 57 N.W.2d 254,
259 (1953); Stabs v. City of Tower, 229 Minn. 552, 565, 40 N.W.2d 362, 371
(1949); Sworski v. Coleman, 204 Minn. 474, 477, 283 N.W. 778, 780 (1939).
It is doubtful that recovery could have been had in several of these cases even
had the court rejected the common law rule, since suit was brought by the
transferee or one standing in his position, so that the defense of contributory
negligence might have been invoked. See Randall v. City of Excelsior, supra;
Stabs v. City of Tower, supra; Sworski v. Coleman, supra. Moreover, the statement was dictum in all the cases, since the only claim asserted was that
provided by the CDA. Finally, Beck v. Groe, supra, apparently the leading
Minnesota case, relies on questionable authority. It cites Hahn v. City of
Ortonville, supra, where the statement is also dictum, and a Wisconsin case,
Demge v. Feierstein, 222 Wis. 199, 268 N.W. 210 (1936), where the statement
was supported by citation of five cases, three of which are supportive only
in dicta, Coy v. Cutting, 138 Kan. 109, 23 P.2d 458 (1933); Kraus v. Schroeder, 105 Neb. 809, 182 N.W. 364 (1921); Healey v. Cady, 104 Vt. 463, 161
Atl. 151 (1932), one of which is irrelevant to the issue, State v. Johnson, 23
S.D. 293, 121 N.W. 785 (1909), and the last of which is weakened by the
presence of a potential contributory negligence claim, Buntin v. Hutton, 206
Ill. App. 194 (1917).
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furnished the liquor.4 Whatever its rationale Swinfin can no
longer be considered controlling on the question of causation.
Since the case was decided a well-established line of Minnesota
authority has imposed upon liquor vendors a common law duty
to exercise reasonable care to protect patrons from drunken
assaults 43 In these cases the Minnesota court has had little
difficulty holding intentional assaults such as that in Swinfin to
be foreseeable,44 characterizing the behavior of inebriates as "unpredictable" and a "well-recognized source of danger to others."4
Existing Minnesota law and public policy seem to have rather
clearly rejected the common law proximate cause rule, whether
it is stated as holding (1) that the inebriate's consumption rather
than the sale is the proximate cause of injury,4 6 or (2) that the
42. The court's terse opinion is not entirely clear. It speaks of the "voluntary" nature of the intoxicated person's act and the "remoteness" of the
plaintiff's injury from the defendants' act. As used by the court, "voluntary"
would appear to imply that the intoxicate's act was unforeseeable to the
defendants when they furnished him liquor. The "remote" characterization of
the injuries likewise appears to be a loose expression for unforeseeability, since
such injuries clearly were factually connected to and not remote in time or
space from the transfer of the liquor. It is of course possible that the issue of
proximate cause was not considered on the basis of "foreseeability," but that
in concluding that plaintiffs damages were "too remote" the court merely
articulated a visceral reaction that as a matter of policy defendants' liability
ought not extend this far. See note 10 supra.
43. See, e.g., Klingbeil v. Truesdell, 256 Minn. 360, 98 N.W. 2d 134
(1959); Priewe v. Bartz, 249 Minn. 488, 83 N.W.2d 116 (1957); Windorski v.
Doyle, 219 Minn. 402, 18 N.W.2d 142 (1945); Mastad v. Swedish Brethren, 83
Minn. 40, 85 N.W. 913 (1901); cf. Sylvester v. Northwestern Hosp., 236 Minn.
384, 53 N.W.2d 17 (1952).
44. Swinfim may also be distinguished from the typical case on the basis of
duty. The defendants in that case were not commercial liquor vendors, but
friends of the intoxicated person who drank with him. The Swinfin court may
have been reluctant to impose upon such persons the same duty as that of
commercial vendors. Such a distinction was made in Mastad v. Swedish
Brethren, 83 MNinn. 40, 44, 85 N.W. 913, 915 (1901), where the court noted
that the Swinim trial disclosed no duty on the part of the defendants to protect persons from the assault.
45. Sylvester v. Northwestern Hosp., 236 Minn. 384, 389, 58 N.W.2d 17,
20-21 (1952). This language has been quoted with approval in Klingbeil v.
Truesdell, 256 Minn. 360, 363, 98 N.W.2d 134, 318 (1959); Priewe v. Bartz,
249 Minn. 488, 492, 83 N.W.2d 116, 120 (1957). Cf. Hall, supra note 22, at
298-99, for a brief discussion of the extent to which crimes are committed
under the influence of alcohol.
46. See, e.g., Collier v. Stamatis, 63 Ariz. 285, 290, 162 P.2d 125, 127-28
(1945). The opinion speaks of the act of the intoxicated person as being the
proximate cause of the injury and of voluntary consumption as being the cause
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inebriate's subsequent assault or negligent operation of an auto4
mobile is an unforeseeable intervening cause1
or (3) that the
8
sale is too remote from the injuries. Treating the consumption
of liquor subsequent to its sale as the sole proximate cause equivalent under the Minnesota causation rule to saying that
it is unforeseeable to the vendor" - seems ridiculous. A subsequent voluntary act was held not to break the causal connection
in Settergrer, where the minor's use of the cartridges was a
voluntary act, or Ferraro,where the lessee's use of the automobile
was also voluntary. The line of cases holding a tavern keeper
liable for failure to exercise reasonable care to protect patrons
one from another further diminishes the significance of intervening voluntary acts in determining liability. 0 It seems no less
foreseeable that an intoxicated person will negligently operate
an automobile than that a minor will negligently discharge a
rifle, or that a lessee of a defective automobile will negligently
continue to operate it, or that an intoxicated person will assault
another patron. In each case the intervening cause is foreseeable
and defendant's negligence puts the chain of events into motion.
In fact the original actor's responsibility for the ultimate injury
appears to be ever greater in the case of the liquor vendor, since
the liquor not only puts the events into motion, but disables
the inebriate from either exercising caution or otherwise controlling his behavior. Finally the injury involved in Wedel v.
Johnson1 seems no less remote or more foreseeable than those
occurring several miles or hours from a negligent transfer of
liquor. Nor does the line of cases which holds that intoxicated
persons are responsible for their acts compel the conclusion that
the vendor is not also liable; to hold him liable is in no sense
to excuse the intoxicated person.5 2 The situation is no different
from the CDA or protection of patrons cases, where the plaintiff
of the intoxication. Presumably this means that the consumption is the sole
proximate cause of the injury.
47. See, e.g., Cowman v. Hansen, 250 Iowa 358, 368-78, 92 N.W.2d 682,
686-90 (1958).
48. See, e.g., State, Use of Joyce v. Hatfield, 197 Md. 249, 255, 78 A.2d
754, 756 (1951); Seibel v. Leach, 233 Wis. 66, 68, 288 N.W. 774, 775 (1939).
49. See text accompanying notes 26-33 supra.
50. See text accompanying notes 43-45 supra.
51. 196 Minn. 170, 264 N.W. 689 (1936); see text accompanying note 45
supra.
52. State v. Weltz, 155 Minn. 143, 193 N.W. 42 (1923); State v. Corrivau,
93 Minn. 38, 100 N.W. 688 (1904); State v. Herdina, 25 Minn. 161 (1878);
State v. Welch, 21 Minn. 22 (1874).
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can proceed against either the vendor or the intoxicated person
or both."

8.

Legislative Preemption

The strongest argument against recognizing a common law
negligence action against liquor vendors is that the legislature
has preempted the field. Briefly stated the argument is that the
legislature, in providing for liability under the CDA and license
bonding provisions," intended that these statutory remedies be
exclusive."" Support for this argument can be drawn from the
sheer quantity of liquor statutes. 6 Moreover, an appealing argument can be made that commercial liquor interests can better
regulate their activities if they are subject to a uniform statutory
scheme.
Although the preemption argument is strong, it is nevertheless partially vulnerable. The statutory provisions are extensive
but they do not constitute the comprehensive scheme from which
it might be inferred that the legislature envisaged an exclusive
occupation of the field. It is particularly significant in this regard
that the legislature failed to provide a remedy for injuries arising
out of the improper or unlawful sale of 8.9 beer. It is difficult
to believe that this legislative silence was intended to indicate
to the courts that negligent sales of such beer should give rise
53. See Village of Brooten v. Cudahy Packing Co., 291 F.2d 284 (8th Cir.
1961) (injured recovered from intoxicate's insurer; insurer sought CDA recovery from vendor); Beck v. Groe, 245 Minn. 28, 70 N.W.2d 886 (1955) (plaintiff sued intoxicated person and dram shop operator under CDA). In Priewe v.
Bartz, 249 Minn. 488, 83 N.W.2d 116 (1957), plaintiff sued both the intoxicated person and the tavern keeper, seeking recovery from the latter for vio]ation of the common law duty to protect patrons. The court affirmed verdicts
against both defendants.
54. Mar. STAT § 840.95 (1961); M.
STAT. ANN. § 340.14 (Supp. 1964).
A brief discussion of the first provision is contained in note 4 supra.
55. The strongest statement by the Minnesota court on this point appears
in Beck v. Groe, 245 Minn. 28, 37, 70 N.W.2d 886, 893 (1955), where it was
said that the sale of liquors has been regulated by statute and "the courts
cannot adopt rules .. . which the legislature did not when it considered the
matter." However, this statement was made in the context of determining
whether 3.2 beer is an "intoxicating liquor" within the meaning of the CDA,
rather than whether a cause of action against liquor dealers exists outside the
CDA.
56. The liquor statutes are codified in Mmx. STAT. ch. 340 (1961), containing 140 sections. Of course this does not include the special legislation
which is in effect but uncodified.
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to no liability."7 Moreover, the court has allowed recovery in
cases whose facts would have brought them within the CDA
provisions if intoxicating liquor rather than 3.2 beer had been
involved."' Although the rationale of these cases is based upon
the common law duty to protect patrons, it appears that the
absence of a statutory remedy was not regarded as precluding
common law liability.
Neither has the court considered the statutory remedy exclusive in cases involving intoxicating liquor. To the contrary,
the court in Windorski v. Doyle 9 tacitly sanctioned the predication of liability upon both negligence per se arising from the
violation of an ordinance and violation of a non-statutory duty.
Although the factual situation was clearly within the scope of
the CDA, there was no mention of the preemption. Aside from
these considerations 0 deciding whether preemption has occurred
requires a determination of legislative intent from a sparse legislative history. In the absence of a clear manifestation of legislative intent to the contrary, it would seem desirable to afford
injured plaintiffs a remedy against liquor vendors for injuries
arising from the failure of the latter to observe statutory requirements.
II. THE DESIRABILITY OF AFFORDING
A COMMON LAW ACTION
A.

CommoN LAw ACTION WouLD FILL

THE

3.2 BEER "VoIm"

The statutory scheme of liability for sale of alcoholic beverages, while arguably complete as to sales of intoxicating liquors,
contains no remedies for injuries arising from sales of 3.2 beer.
57. See Note, Liability Under the Minnesota Civil Damage Act, 46 MuN.
L. REv. 169, 188 (1961), where the 3.2 beer void has been termed "unwarranted," and amendment of the CDA urged.
58. See, e.g., Klingbeil v. Truesdell, 256 Minn. 360, 98 N.W.2d 134 (1959);
Priewe v. Bartz, 249 Minn. 488, 83 N.W.2d 116 (1957). In each case the
plaintiff was assaulted by a drunken fellow-patron who had been served 3.2
beer by the defendant.
59. 219 Minn. 402, 18 N.W.2d 142 (1945).
60. Repeal of a dramshop act did not prevent Pennsylvania from recognizing the common law action. See Schelin v. Goldberg, 188 Pa. Super. 341,
146 A.2d 648 (1958). Yet, if the dramshop act had been deemed an exclusive
remedy by virtue of legislative preemption, arguably its repeal while other
liquor statutes were retained should have been ground for concluding that
the legislature intended that there be no remedy. See also Waynick v. Chicago's
Last Dep't Store, 269 F.2d 322, 324 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S.
903 (1960), where the sale occurred in Illinois, but the plaintiffs, Michigan
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No penalty bond is required of 3.2 licenseese and the CDA has
been held inapplicable to sales of 3.2 beer.62 This "void" is illogical
from the viewpoint of social policy. The alcoholic content of most
strong beers, defined by Minnesota law as intoxicating liquor,"
is only about one percentage point greater than that of 3.2 beer. 4
It seems unreasonable that the vendor's liability should hinge
upon such a distinction." The legislature has traditionally regulated the sale of 3.2 beer closely. 6 Since it has provided no
remedy for injuries arising from illegal sales, recognition of a
common law negligence action would afford otherwise unobtainable relief and encourage adherence to 3.2 beer laws and yet only
impose a responsibility upon vendors which could be met by
simple compliance with the law.
B.

COMMON LAw AcTioN Wouan SuRvIVE TiE VENDOR'S
DEATH

The survival of actions is controlled by statute in Minnesota 7
since no claims survived the death of either party at common
law." The Minnesota statute provides that a cause of action for
personal injuries dies with the person against whom it exists unless grounded upon an allegation that the decedent was negligent." It further provides that a cause of action arising out of
personal injuries dies with the injured party except to the extent
that it survives in favor of his surviving spouse and next of kin
residents, were injured by the intoxicated person in Michigan. The Illinois
dramshop act had been held to have no extraterritorial effect. The court
rejected the defendant's argument that the legislature had preempted the
field, holding that it had merely "avoided" treatment of the factual situation
under consideration.
61. See MIm. STAT. § 840.02 (1961).
62. See Beck v. Groe, 245 Minn. 28, 70 N.W.2d 886 (1955).
63. See Mmx. STAT. § 340.07 (1961).
64. See 4 ENCYcLoPEDIA AMERICANA 454 (1960); 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA ERITANNICA 815 (1949). These figures are limited to the common American beers.
Other types of beer, such as ale, contain greater percentages of alcohol.
65. See Note, 46 anuw. L. REv. 169, 188 (1961).
66. Notwithstanding passage of the less restrictive S.2 Beer Act in 1933,
some of the earlier and more rigorous provisions applicable to such beer remain unrepealed. See Mum. STAT. §§ 340.78--.731 (1961).
67. See Mnqm. STAT. § 573.01 (1961).
68. E.g., Hachnan v. Mayo Clinic, 150 F. Supp. 468, 469 (D. Minn. 1957);
Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. St. Paul Gas Light Co., 152 Minn. 197, 198, 188 N.W.
265 (1922).
69. See Mum. STAT. § 573.01 (1961).
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under the wrongful death act."o The CDA provides for recovery
not only by the injured person, but also by certain of his relatives, his employer, and "other persons" injured in "property,
or means of support." 7 '
As a result of this statutory scheme the result of an action
under the CDA by the surviving relatives of a decedent would
not differ greatly from that of a similar action predicated on
negligence. In either case the survivors could recover for certain
of their losses from one who is regarded as having caused the
death by an improper transfer of liquor.72 On the other hand, if
the defendant-vendor dies, the CDA action dies with him, because it is not based upon negligence.7 3 Since a common law
action would be founded upon negligence, it would survive.
Therefore, if the existence of a common law remedy were recognized, the fortuity that the vendor lives or is incorporated would
no longer be essential to recovery by the injured party.
C.

CommoN LAw AcTIoN Wouim
ADVANTAGES IN EVENT OF THE

GivE THE PLAINTIFF

CERTAIN

DEFENDANT's BANKRUPTcY

Where the sale of liquor and opportunity for institution of a
suit for damages have occurred before the filing of a bankruptcy
petition by the vendor, the Bankruptcy Act" provides certain
advantages to plaintiffs with claims based upon negligence. The
right to recover damages in a pending negligence action is
"provable" under section 63(a) (7). It may be asserted to partake
70. See Mmx. STAT. § 573.01 (1961). The wrongful death act, MINN.
573.02 (1961), provides that the personal representative of the decedent
may maintain an action against the person whose wrongful act or omission
caused the death of the decedent, if the decedent could have maintained an
action for his injuries had he lived.
71. See MmN. STAT. § 340.95 (1961).
72. Although the actions under the CDA and the wrongful death action
are similar, there are certain important differences. For example, the damages
recoverable under the wrongful death act are limited to $25,000.00, but no
limitation exists under the CDA. See Mim. STAT. M 573.02, 340.95 (1961).
Moreover, the defense of contributory negligence is available in a wrongful
death action, see, e.g., Jenson v. Glemaker, 195 Minn. 556, 263 N.W. 624
(1935), although there is a rebuttable presumption that the decedent was in
the exercise of due care at the time of the occurrence giving rise to the action,
Mmx. STAT. § 602.04 (1961). This defense is not available in CDA action.
73. See MumN. STAT. § 578.01 (1961), Dahl v. Northwestern Natl Bank,
265 Minn. 216, 121 N.W.2d 321 (1963).
74. The present Bankruptcy Act was first enacted in 1898, 30 Stat. 544,
and was extensively amended in 1938 by the Chandler Act, 52 Stat. 840
(1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1255 (1958).
STAT. J
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in the bankrupt's estate for whatever partial payment it may
yield in return for discharge.7 5 Since CDA actions have been held
not to involve negligence," however, a claim reflected in a pending CDA action would probably not be "provable," and consequently the CDA claimant would not partake of the bankrupt's
estate and his claim would not be discharged. 7 Thus the negligence claimant possesses an option lacked by his CDA counterpart. He can file suit, assert his provable claim, and receive
partial compensation, or withhold the filing of the suit until after
the bankruptcy petition has been filed and seek satisfaction of
his claim if and when the bankrupt becomes solvent.78 Although
this choice may involve an extremely difficult problem of predicting the bankrupt's future success, 79 the option is more desirable
than the mere hope for later satisfaction.o
D.

CommoN LAw AcTIoN MAY ALLow PLAINTIFF TO OBTAIN
REDRESS FROM DEFENDANT'S PUBLIc LIABILITY INSUmE

Public liability insurance policies issued to vendors of intoxicating liquor customarily exclude coverage for liability imposed
75. Only provable claims are allowed to partake of the bankrupt's estate.
See 52 Stat. 878 (1988), 11 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1958); 3 ComRan, BANKurc
§ 63.02, at 1761 (14th ed. 1964). However, the fact that a claim is provable
under § 63 of the act does not necessarily mean that it will be allowed to
partake in the bankrupt's estate. See generally 3 CoLLM , op. cit. supra §
68.05, at 1775-78. With some exceptions, unimportant for present purposes,
§ 17 of the act provides for discharge only from provable debts. 52 Stat. 851
(1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 35(a) (1958).
76. Dah1 v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank, 265 Minn. 216, 220, 121 N.W.2d
321, 324 (1963) (for purpose of determining whether a CDA claim survives
the death of the defendant under the Minnesota survival statute); Hahn v.
City of Ortonville, 238 Minn. 428, 433, 57 N.W.2d 254, 258 (1953) (for purpose of determining whether to apply the common law doctrine of governmental tort immunity to CDA suits against municipal liquor stores).
77. See note 75 supra.
78. If the action upon the claim were not instituted prior to the filing of
the bankruptcy petition, the claim would not be provable, and consequently
would not be discharged. See note 75 supra. However the statute of limitations
will limit the time during which the plaintiff can bring suit. If the vendor
is not under pressure from other creditors he may delay filing a bankruptcy
petition. Plaintiff may then be forced to institute his action or forego recovery
altogether. Thus he will have been deprived of his option not to participate
in any subsequent bankruptey proceedings. See MAcLAcaruar, BANKRUPTCY
128-29 (1956).

79. It may also produce jockeying between the defendant and plaintiff
to determine whether the former can force the latter to institute the liability
suit before the bankruptcy petition is filed.
80. The preceding text has discussed only two of ten possible sequences

1172

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:1154

under dramshop acts.8 Usually, they provide that the insurer will
pay, up to the limits of coverage, all amounts for which the insured becomes liable for bodily injuries arising out of the ownership, maintenance, and use of the premises.82 This language would
seem to encompass common law claims arising from injuries
proximately caused by an illegal or negligent sale of liquor."
of events of a liability suit and bankruptcy proceedings. In summary form
these ten are:
Sequence 1 Illegal Filing of
Judgment on Bankruptcy
Discharge
Sale
liability suit liability suit petition filed
(sale) (suit)
(judgment)
(filing)
(discharge)
Sequence 2 sale
suit
filing
judgment
discharge
Sequence 3 sale
suit
filing
discharge
judgment
Sequence 4 sale
filing
suit
judgment
discharge
Sequence 5 sale
filing
suit
discharge
judgment
Sequence 6 sale
filing
discharge
suit
judgment
Sequence 7 filing sale
suit
judgment
discharge
judgment
discharge
suit
Sequence 8 fling sale
discharge
judgment
suit
Sequence 9 filing sale
judgment
sale
suit
discharge
Sequence 10 filing
In sequence 1, the judgment on either a CDA or negligence claim would
clearly be a provable debt. See Chandler Act § 63(a)(1), 52 Stat. 873 (1938),
11 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1958).
Sequences 2 and 3 are discussed in the text.
Sequences 4, 5, and 6 would cause neither a CDA nor a negligence claim
to be provable since it would be neither pending at the time the bankruptcy
petition was filed (negligence) nor evidenced by a judgment at that time
(CDA). See § 63(a). Moreover, § 63(a)(8) of the act, making "contingent
debts" provable, 52 Stat. 873 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 103(a)(8) (1958) has been
interpreted by commentators to refer to claims that were otherwise provable
under § 63(a). 3 CoILiER, BANKRUPTCY § 63.30, at 1912-13 (14th ed. 1964);
NADima, BANRaUrrCY § 239 (1948). However, one writer has expressed doubt
as to the validity of this construction. CowANs, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND
PRAcTICE J 367, at 202-03 (1963).
Sequences 7, 8, and 9 will generally not arise. Since the bankrupt has
already failed in his operation of the business, the court will be reluctant to
grant the trustee power to continue it after the bankruptcy petition has been
filed. For a brief discussion of the power of bankruptcy trustees to operate
a business, see MAcLACHLAN, BANKRUPTCY 76-77 (1956).
Sequence 10 presents no problems; since the sale occurred after the discharge, the claimant would have no interest in the bankruptey proceedings.
81. See, e.g., policy provisions quoted in Gannon v. Cosmopolitan Mut.
Ins. Co., 34 Misc. 2d 365, 366-67, 927 N.Y.S.2d 961, 963 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
82. See, e.g., policy provisions quoted in London & Lancashire Indem.
Co. of America v. Duryea, 143 Conn. 53, 55, 119 A.2d 325, 326 (1955); Gannon v. Cosmopolitan Mut. Ins. Co., supra note 81 at 366, 227 N.Y.S.2d at
963.
83. The opposite conclusion was reached in the only discovered case
directly on point. In Ranochia v. Reliance Ins. Co., Civil No. 2224, Pa. Ct.
C.P., Lackawanna County, Nov. 16, 1962, a vendor settled a common law
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However, since this risk may have been uncontemplated by both
liquor vendors and insurers, serious questions of coverage may
negligence claim based upon an illegal sale of liquor and sought reimbursement
from his insurer. The policy covered hazards arising from the ownership and
operation of the premises, but excluded "liability imposed upon the insured
... as a person engaged in the business of . .. selling ...

alcoholic beverages

... by reason of any statute or ordinance pertaining to the sale, gift, distribution or use of any alcoholic beverage . . . ." Id. at 2. The court reasoned
that the common law civil liability of a liquor vendor depended upon his
violation of the criminal liquor laws, and that "liability imposed by statute"
includes common law liability for breach of a duty imposed by a criminal
statute. This argument seems clearly erroneous. The criminal statute creates
a duty, breach of which is negligence, but it does not of itself "impose liability."
Arguably, since Pennsylvania has no dramshop act, the court could look
only to the criminal liquor statutes. Otherwise, the exclusion for liability
imposed by statute would have been meaningless. It seems clear, however,
that the clause was part of a standard form used in many states, some of
which do have dramshop acts, so that the insurer never intended the clause
to refer to the criminal statutes. Regardless of the construction given the
clause in a state without a dramshop act, it is easily distinguishable from the
interpretation which ought to be placed upon it in a state such as Minnesota,
where the clause arguably refers only to the CDA.
Three cases, although not directly in point, would appear opposite to the
Ranockia decision. In London &Lancashire Indem. Co. of America v. Duryea,
148 Conn. 5S, 119 A.2d 325 (1955), it was held that the policy did not cover
liability under the Connecticut dramshop act, which imposes liability for
sale to an obviously intoxicated person whose intoxication causes the plaintiff's injury. Since the existence of a state of intoxication necessarily precedes
the defendant's sale, little if any causal relationship need exist between the
sale and the injury. Id. at 57, 119 A.2d at 87-28. The policy language,
"arising out of," was construed to mean "caused by," and the policy was held
to cover only those situations where there was a more direct causal relationship than was required by the dramshop act. Id. at 59, 119 A.2d at 328. It
seems clear, however, that in a common law action, where the sale must be
the proximate cause of the accident, even this interpretation of "arising out
of" would be satisfied. In Gannon v. Cosmopolitan Mut. Ins. Co., 34 Mise. 2d
365, 227 N.Y.S.2d 961 (Sup. Ct. 1962), plaintiff obtained judgment against
vendor on the common law theory of negligent failure to protect his patrons
and sought recovery from the vendor's liability insurer. The court held that
the policy covered such liability nothwithstanding the insurer's argument
that the express exclusion of dramshop act liability included all liability
arising from the sale of liquor. Finally, Lessak v. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co.,
168 Ohio St. 153, 151 N.E.2d 780 (1958), held that the policy covered the
alleged liability of a hardware dealer who, in violation of statute, sold B-Bs
to a minor who injured plaintiff with his B-B gun. It held that such liability
was clearly within the insured hazard of "ownership, maintenance and use"
of the insured's business. Liability imposed at common law for injury arising
from the sale of B-Bs would appear to be no different than liability for the
sale of liquor.
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arise and require attention in the event a common law remedy is
expressly recognized."8
CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding numerous holdings and dicta to the contrary,
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, the Seventh Circuit, and perhaps
Minnesota have recognized a common law liability of liquor vendors for injuries arising from their negligent transfer of intoxicants. Usually, breach of this duty is premised upon violation of
a statute or ordinance, and it is held that such violation is either
negligence per se or evidence of negligence. These holdings represent a reversal of the traditional rules that a transfer of liquor
to a "competent" person never constitutes negligence, or that the
injury is not proximately caused by the sale because it was unforeseeable or remote. However, the development of Minnesota
law in collateral fields indicates that no reason exists why an
illegal sale should not be regarded as negligent, particularly where
the vendor is put on notice of its illegality and the statute violated was enacted to protect plaintiff from the injury suffered.
Nor is there any policy reason why the vendor should not be expected to foresee the natural consequences of his act, including
likely intervening causes.
A barrier to recognition of the common law action is legislative
preemption. Although the arguments in favor of preemption are
cogent, they do not seem persuasive in the absence of a clear
manifestation of legislative intent. On the other hand, recognition
of the action would provide compensation for injuries arising from
sales of 3.2 beer and facilitate recovery from unincorporated vendors whose death might otherwise cause the claim to die. The
common law action would also provide limited advantages in the
event of the vendor's bankruptcy, but could be expected to raise
serious coverage questions under vendors' public liability insurance policies.
Although express recognition of the action may appear revolutionary, it should be remembered that it would be subject to the
usual common law negligence limitations. The intoxicated person,
for example, would probably be held contributorily negligent if
84. Existing rates may not reflect this risk exposure. This problem, however, can undoubtedly be solved by a rewording of the coverage provisions.
For example, the policy could be worded so as to restrict coverage to injuries occurring on the insured's premises, see TA APPIAw, INsoRnAxCE
LAW AND PRAcem § 4493.2 (1962), or to exclude coverage of injuries arising
out of automobile accidents, see id. § 4500, at 66-68.
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he were suing for his own injuries. 5 Likewise, a passenger who
knowingly rode with an intoxicated person no doubt would be
held to have assumed the risk of an accident. Furthermore, it
appears that the proximate cause requirements of the common
law action would be more stringent than those of the CDA. 7
These limitations would serve to keep the action well within the
purpose of the liquor statutes.
85. See Randall v. Village of Excelsior, 258 Minn. 81, 103 N.W.2d 131
(1960). But see Smith v. Clark, 411 Pa. 142, 190 A.2d 441 (1963).
86. Cf. Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, Inc., 249 Miinn. 376, 82 N.W.2d 365
(1957).
87. Compare Smith v. Clark, 411 Pa. 142, 190 A.2d 441 (1963) (the illegal
sale must be the proximate cause of the accident), with MumN. STAT. 340.95
(1961) (the CDA) ("injured ... by any intoxicated person") and Sworski v.
Coleman, 208 Minn. 43, 50, 293 N.W. 297, 300 (1940) ("it is not necessary
that the intoxication be the proximate cause of the injury" under the CDA).

